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The Case for Safety
One always seeks safety, but how does one show it?
Demonstrating safety has always been a requirement in
some fashion, but the protocols used for that have developed
over the years along with the methods used to ensure safety,
particularly as practice developed in one industry is read
across into another. Arguably the biggest in uence on
modern process safety has been the development of loss
prevention² . In uences have also crossed industry bound-
aries such as the nuclear industry development of safety
methodologies feeding into QRA, and the advances in the
offshore industry particularly following Piper Alpha. This
issue, we hope, illuminates the developments, and shows
something of what remains to be done. But what of
demonstrating safety?
Going back to the 1950s, safety was principally taken
to be demonstrated by the engineering; from the bottom
up. If each element of a plant were built to appropriate
standards, then the entire plant would be safe. Most
engineers  nd this philosophy very seductive. It suits the
division of plant into units, it  atters the ability to design
infallibly and even implies that should there be an error it
can be readily corrected and perfection re-attained.
No single event changed this, of course. But one of the
most in uential in the UK was the Flixborough disaster of
1974. A poorly conceived temporary plant modi cation
was the point of failure, and the causes were several,
principally in the systems used to manage and to modify
plant. It was the consequences that had the public impact.
28 people killed (so few because it was a Saturday and a
light shift). Gas cloud explosions, formerly somewhat
esoteric phenomena, were thrust into public perception and
not unreasonably it was demanded that events of this
magnitude should never recur. This eventually led in the UK
to the Control of Industrial Major Hazards Regulations
where the demonstration of safety started with the potential
hazard and its potential magnitude and then addressed the
appropriateness of the protection and mitigation. This top
down approach to demonstrating safety was adopted in the
later Seveso I Directive of the EU (named after the Italian
incident at Seveso where unintended process products were
released).
Safety methodology development at this time had a
strong focus on consequences. Understanding and model-
ling explosive and toxic releases became in some places
a minor industry in itself. This, whilst  lling real gaps in
knowledge, did not in itself show how such events were, or
could be, protected against.
The nuclear industry had gone down a similar route
somewhat in advance of the process industry. Perhaps this
was due to early appreciation of the potential magnitude
of a major nuclear accident. But certainly techniques were
developed to model the consequences of accidents and
also their likelihood, or probability. Together these led
naturally to the use of risk in demonstrating safety;
consequence and probability give answers to the  rst two
questions of risk analysis– ‘How Bad?’ and ‘How Often?’
The consequence analyses for different materials are very
different, but the techniques for reliability analysis are
similar. The rapidly developing process industry conse-
quence modelling was combined with reliability tech-
niques such as fault tree and event tree analysis that had
been successfully applied in the nuclear industry. For
process applications it was called Quantitative Risk
Analysis (QRA); for some reason the nuclear terminology
of Probabilistic Risk Assessment or Probabilistic Safety
Assessment was never adopted.
An additional spur to the use of risk in demonstrating
safety was the Canvey Island public inquiry in 1978. This
was a planning inquiry into an extension of the large
petrochemical complex at Canvey on the Thames estuary.
It presented a particular problem for regulation since it
had grown up before many of the modern planning criteria
had been formulated. And those criteria were designed
to apply to proposals to build a plant, with guidelines for
things such as proximity to housing. At Canvey the plant
existed and so did the housing. How to decide if an
extension would be tolerable?
The Health and Safety Executive, in giving advice on
the planning application, grasped the problem and took
risk analysis as the solution. The exercise showed high
risk parts in the existing plant and led to a series of risk
reduction measures, which illustrated the practical utility
of the methods. But for demonstrating safety Canvey has
a particular signi cance because it was exposed to Parlia-
mentary scrutiny and debate and therefore has some
legitimacy outside the technical community. It remains a
benchmark still from that point of view.
Risk became something of a talisman as well as a tool.
The USA in particular strongly developed nuclear risk
analysis, and in Europe both the UK and Holland pursued
process industry applications, Holland carrying risk into
formal legislation.
At roughly the same period the comparability of risks
was receiving much attention and discussion. This brought
into debate issues as much philosophical as practical. For
example, equity between different populations– workers,
members of the public, distant populations in other
countries, future generations as against current. In terms
of major accident risk a, perhaps the, big issue was linearity
of risk with consequence. Is it as tolerable to kill 100
people once in 100 years as it is to kill one person per year?
This led to debate over the use of complex risk represen-
tations such as frequency consequence diagrams (‘f-N ’
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curves in particular). These were used at the Canvey Island
inquiry. One of the longest public airings of such risk
standards was the Sizewell nuclear plant planning inquiry
in 1986. The latter continued to reinforce the use of risk as
an aid to judgement. But in terms of accident size, the view
then and now seems to be that large accidents are in some
way worse; but there is no universal standard, and no
success in developing an agreed metric of risk to use
quantitatively to demonstrate safety in all applications.
Whilst the late 1970s and early 1980s were perhaps the
heyday of mechanistic risk assessment, the use of risk to
underpin decisions survived beyond then. The Health and
Safety Executive in its document Tolerability of Risk from
Nuclear Power Stations (1988) encapsulated an approach
far broader than the title of that publication suggests.
Broadly: there is a risk too high to tolerate; a risk too low
to worry over; and in between there is no single solution.
Judgement must be exercised and risks made ‘as low as
reasonably practicable’. The risk measure is essentially
con ned to individual risk for most practical purposes.
Still, the world then becomes one of options rather than
single solutions and comparisons rather than absolute
criteria. The nature of such an approach puts the onus on
a plant owner/operator to show why he or she considers
the safety adequate and appropriate.
The formal statement, the demonstration, is encapsulated
in the safety case. As a vehicle the safety case had appeared
much earlier, in elaborate and advanced form for high
technology plant such as nuclear, in less quantitative but
still philosophically the same for signi cant chemical
plant. The use of risk tolerability brought a further degree
of common ground to the quanti cation and signi cant
assistance to the judgement of safety case acceptability.
The ‘third age’ of safety cases is one of fuller recognition
of systems where it is extremely dif cult to demonstrate
safety. Software is one example. Recognition of the
fallibility of software is akin to the earlier recognition of
the fallibility of engineering design. The techniques for
controlling software design and managing its construction
to good standards have developed rapidly recently. But
demonstrating and quantifying software safety is still an
area for some development.
The other major system where safety is dif cult to
demonstrate is of course people. Human error at the level
of plant operation has been recognized and to some degree
quanti ed for a long time. But human behaviour in the
creation and operation of management systems? That has
been the subject of much research and erudition, but still
methods do not seem to have made their way into safety
case practice with the ubiquity that, say, fault tree analysis
has for demonstrating the fallibility (or reliability) of
engineered systems.
Nevertheless the safety case has become a vehicle
without serious competition for the means by which safety
in technology is demonstrated. The stress on quanti cation
is perhaps lower than it was, especially in more modest
hazard applications. This year the Control of Major Hazard
Regulations came into force in the UK as the enactment
of the European Seveso II Directive. This brings into
regulation 2000 previously exempt industrial sites and
requires a ‘major accident prevention plan’ as a demonstra-
tion of the adequacy of protection against and planning
for serious accidents. This is, to all intents and purposes, a
safety case to an appropriate level. This spreading of the
safety case approach is more than just the coverage of
more sites: the regulations require that protection against
environmental accidents is also addressed.
Increasingly, the case for safety is the safety case.
The papers in this special issue re ect the past and future
of the techniques that support both the ensurance and the
assurance of safety. Many are accepted automatically now
as part of the safety case for an installation; one tends to
forget that they were not always available.
The paper by Trevor Kletz follows the developments of
loss prevention, in the 1970s particularly. This was the
period when the conduct of safety started to be a specialism
in its own right. Loss prevention from experience started to
be loss prevention by prediction; techniques such as Hazop
were born and eventually the virtues of inherently safe
design became commonplace– self regulation the norm
rather than the exception.
Mike Hayns’ paper illustrates the development of
quanti cation of rare events in the industry which pioneered
it; probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in the nuclear
industry. In the decade from 1975 to 1985 methods
including fault tree and event tree analysis and systematic
use of expert judgement were brought to a stage of high
re nement, and their transfer to other hazardous industry
followed closely.
The paper by Frank Crawley examines this progression in
the speci c case of the offshore oil industry. The Piper
Alpha accident of 1988 accelerated the change. It preci-
pitated the change from prescriptive to goal based regula-
tion, and the adoption of the safety case. The inevitable
proximity of operators to hazard in the offshore industry
both focused the need and led to many special safety
considerations.
Finally, Norbert Gibson’s article (the eleventh Vernon
Clancey Memorial Lecture) focuses on the need to underpin
techniquewith understanding.The need better to understand
the fundamental science is always there. There is now
perhaps more understandingof the mutual need for this than
before, and multi-sponsored projects are recognized as the
way ahead.
The pursuit of safety and its justi cation is not one with
an end, but the changes over the past ten or twenty years
have arguably seen the gap between new technology and its
management control close greatly.
Michael Brown
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